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Cornhusker Economics
Corruption and Cooperative Organizations
Market Report
Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn,
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Southwest NE, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Central NE, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Central NE, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow
Southeast NE, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
⃰ No Market

Year
Ago

110.00

4 Wks
Ago

10-9-20

*

*

159.39

162.21

161.11

152.82

150.60

149.66

214.12

222.12

216.04

*

*

*

76.74

79.83

93.27

141.10

136.31

162.88

396.39

424.93

437.30

3.68

NA

4.84

3.83

NA

3.67

8.41

NA

10.00

6.13

NA

4.55

3.21

NA

2.96

*

155.00

155.00

107.50

*

*

100.00

100.00

100.00

147.00

151.00

165.00

50.00

44.08

49.58

Cooperatives, like other forms of business firms,
operate within the prevailing economic environment. Corruption — which involves “… some
aspect of transaction for personal gain, ignoring
of community trust, misuse of authority and responsibility to the social system, and/or sacrifice
of group for private gain” (Hamer, 1981, p. 202)
— is an important part of this environment.
Although the literature is limited, there is evidence that corruption in cooperatives and investor-owned firms (IOF) is widespread in developing and transition economies where corruption
generally is common. Cooperative corruption is
also found closer to home. Two recent examples
from the United States include the Ashby Farmers’ Cooperative Elevator in Minnesota where the
general manager stole from the cooperative and
the Tri-County Electric Cooperative in South
Carolina where board members enriched themselves with perks and benefits. In Canada, the
PACE Credit Union was placed under the regulator’s control in 2018 after two senior executives
were discovered to have received secret loans and
payments from the credit union.
Despite its prevalence, corruption has been largely ignored in the economic literature. The result is
that little is known about its impact on the output
and prices generated by firms and the benefits
that firms create for society. Since a common raison d’etre for cooperatives is their ability to provide better returns for their members, corrupt
behavior in these organizations could jeopardize
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the achievement of this objective. In particular, one of
the recurring themes in the economic literature on
agricultural cooperatives is that they are procompetitive — i.e., because of their ownership structure, they are assumed to operate at cost, thus forcing
monopsonistic or oligopsonistic processing firms to
increase prices and, at least partially, offset the market
power these firms exert.
This result, however, typically rests on the assumption
that cooperatives and IOFs share a common cost and
revenue structure. If cooperatives face higher costs or
lower revenues than IOFs because of greater managerial corruption, the pro-competitive effect could be
jeopardized. It is expected that cooperative managers
might engage in more corruption because it is believed that managerial corruption is positively linked
to economic activity; the intuition is that greater activity offers more incentive for corrupt activities such
as bribes. Since cooperatives are generally expected to
produce more output than their investor-owned
counterparts, the question that arises is whether the
competition effect could be offset by the corruption
effect.
A key objective of a research paper we published in
the latest issue of the Canadian Journal of Agricultural
Economics was to determine if the presence of corruption in cooperative organizations can jeopardize their
pro-competitive impact.
Our results reveal that, although it is welfare reducing,
corruption does not reverse/outweigh the competitive
effect of cooperatives. Importantly, this result holds
regardless of the functional form of the production
function or of the farm input supply curve, and regardless of whether the organization (cooperative or
IOF) is a price taker or has market power in the
downstream market for the product. In short, the procompetitive effect dominates under almost all market
conditions.
While the results presented in this paper provide support for the pro-competitive effect of cooperatives,
they also suggest that this effect can be expected to be
greater when it is costly to engage in corruption.
However, when the cost of corruption is low, the likelihood is greater of a convergence in the corruption
level chosen by cooperatives and IOFs, and in a convergence of their performance (prices paid, benefits
created). In such situations, it is expected that cooperatives are less able to provide a competitive benefit

and would be more difficult to introduce and/or
maintain.
One of the key factors determining corruption
costs is the economic environment in which firms
operate. Although cooperatives are found in countries with widely different corruption levels, the
vast majority of the 300 largest cooperatives in the
world are found in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries
where corruption is relatively low. This concentration is consistent with our finding that cooperatives
enjoy an advantage in environments where corruption is costly. However, other factors, some of them
firm-specific — such as the nature of the governance structure — can also be at work. Indeed, further research is required to understand the reasons
for the corruption found in U.S. and Canadian cooperatives which, while low, is nevertheless of concern.
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